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This paper studies the problem of computing Nash equilibrium in wireless networks modeled by
Weighted Timed Automata. Such formalism comes together with a logic that can be used to describe
complex features such as timed energy constraints. Our contribution is a method for solving this
problem using Statistical Model Checking. The method has been implemented in UPPAAL model
checker and has been applied to the analysis of Aloha CSMA/CD and IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA
protocols.
1 Introduction
One of the important aspects in designing wireless ad-hoc networks is to make sure that a network is
robust to the selfish behavior of its participants. This problem can be formulated in terms of a game
considering that network nodes behave in a rational way and want to maximize their utility. A wireless
network is robust iff its configuration satisfies Nash equilibrium (NE), i.e. it is not profitable for a node
to alter its behavior to the detriment of other nodes.
In this paper we propose a new methodology to compute NE in wireless ad-hoc networks. Our
approach is based on Statistical Model Checking (SMC) [24, 18], an approach used in the formal verifi-
cation area. SMC has a wide range of applications in the areas such as systems biology or automotive.
The core idea of SMC is to monitor a number of simulations of a system and then use the results of
statistics (e.g. sequential analysis) to get an overall estimate of the probability that the system will be-
have in some manner. Thus SMC can help to overcome the undecidability issues, that arise in the formal
analysis of wireless ad-hoc networks [1]. While the idea ressembles the one of classical Monte Carlo
simulation, it is based on a formal semantics of systems that allows us to reason on very complex behav-
ioral properties of systems (hence the terminology). This includes classical reachability property such as
“can i reach such a state?”, but also non trivial properties such as “can i reach this state x times in less
than y units of time?”.
Here we use a semantics for systems that is based on timed automata. We assume that elements
of a network are modeled using Weighted Timed Automata (WTA), that is a model for timed system
together with a stochastic semantics. The model permits, for example, to describe stochastically how the
behaviors of a system involve with respect to time. As an example, probability can be used to say that
the system is more likely to move to the next state in five units of time rather than in ten. Our approach
permits to describe arbitrary distributions when combining individual components. In addition, WTA
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are equiped with nice communication primitives between components, including e.g. message passing.
The fact that we rely on WTA allows us to describe utility functions with cost constraint temporal logic
called PWCTL. PWCTL is a logic that allows to temporally quantify on behaviors of components as
well as on their individual features (cost, energy consumption). By the existing results, we know that one
can always define a probability measure on sets of run of a WTA that satisfy a given property written in
cost constraint temporal logic. The latter clearly arises the importance of defining a formal semantics for
system’s models.
Going back to modeling wireless ad-hoc network, we will assume that each node can work according
to one out of finitely many configurations that we call strategies (a strategy being a choice of a config-
uraiton). We also assume that each network node has a goal and a node’s utility function is equal to
the probability that this goal will be reached on a random system run. Each node will be represented
with a WTA and a goal will be described with PWCTL. Our algorithm for computing NE consists of
two phases. First, we apply simulation-based algorithm to compute a strategy that most likely (heuristic)
satisfies NE. This is done by monitoring several runs of the systems with respect to a property and then
use classical Monte Carlo ratio to estimate the probability that this strategy is indeed the good one. In
the second phase we apply statistics to test the hypothesis that this strategy actually satisfies NE. Indeed,
it is well-known that such a NE may not exist [16], so our statistical algorithm goes for the best estimate
out of it that corresponds to a relaxed NE for the system.
We implemented a distributed version of this algorithm that uses UPPAAL statistical model checker
as a simulation engine [13]. The UPPAAL toolset offers a nice user interface that makes it one of the most
widely used formal verification based tool in academia. Thanks to the independent simulations that the
algorithm generates, this problem can easily be parallelized and distributed on, e.g., PC clusters.
Finally, we apply our tool to the analysis of two probabilistic CSMA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access)
protocols: k-persistent Aloha CSMA/CD protocol and IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA protocol. The two
case studies we present in this paper serve mainly demonstration purposes. However, we are the first
who study Nash Equilibrium in unslotted Aloha (the slotted version of Aloha was previously studied
in [19] and [23]). Our result that there exists only “always transmit” Nash Equilibrium strategy in IEEE
802.15.4 CSMA/CA reproduces the analogous result for the IEEE 802.11 CSMA/CA protocol [9].
The problem of computing Nash Equilibrium in wireless ad-hoc networks was first considered in [19]
and surveid in [23]. Most of existing works are based on an analytical solution which does not scale well
with complex models [15, 19]. Similarly to us, some other works [9] are based on a simulation-based
approach. However, contrary to us, they do not assign any statistical confidence to the results, and they
do not take advantage of temporal logic to express arbitrary objectives.
2 Weighted Timed Automata
In this section, we briefly recap the concept of Weighted Timed Automata (WTA), see [12] for more
details. We denote B(X) to be a finite conjunction of bounds of the form x∼ n where x ∈ X , n ∈ IIN, and
∼∈ {<,≤,>,≥}.
Definition 1 A Weighted Timed Automaton1 (WTA) is a tuple A = (L, ℓ0,X ,E,R, I) where: (i) L is a
finite set of locations, (ii) ℓ0 ∈ L is the initial location, (iii) X is a finite set of real-valued variables called
1In the classical notion of priced timed automata [6, 5] cost-variables (e.g. clocks where the rate may differ from 1) may
not be referenced in guards, invariants or in resets, thus making e.g. optimal reachability decidable. This is in contrast to our
notion of WTA, which is as expressive as linear hybrid systems [10].
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clocks, (iv) E ⊆ L×B(X)×2X ×L is a finite set of edges, (v) R : L → Z≥0 assigns a rate vector to each
location, and (vi) I : L →B(X) assigns an invariant to each location.
A state of a WTA is a pair (l,v) that consists of a location l and a valuation of clocks ν : X → IR≥0.
From a state (l,v) ∈ L× IRX≥0 a WTA can either let time progress or do a discrete transition and reach
a new location. During time delay clocks are growing with the rates defined by R(l), and the resulting
clock valuation should satisfy invariant I(l). A discrete transition from (l,v) to (l′,v′) is possible if there
is (l,g,Y, l′) ∈ E such that v satisfies g and v′ is obtained from v by resetting clocks from the set Y to 0.
A run of WTA is a sequence of alternating time and discrete transitions. Several WTA M1,M2, . . . ,Mn,
can communicate via inputs and outputs to generate Networks of WTAs (NWTAs) M1‖M2‖ . . .‖Mn.
In our early works [12], the stochastic semantics of WTA components associates probability distri-
butions on both the delays one can spend in a given state as well as on the transition between states. In
UPPAAL uniform distributions are applied for bounded delays and exponential distributions for the case
where a component can remain indefinitely in a state. In a network of WTAs the components repeatedly
race against each other, i.e. they independently and stochastically decide on their own how much to delay
before outputting, with the “winner” being the component that chooses the minimum delay. As observed
in [12], the stochastic semantics of each WTA is rather simple (but quite realistic), arbitrarily complex
stochastic behavior can be obtained by their composition when mixing individual distributions through
message passing. The beauty of our model is that these distributions are naturally and automatically
defined by the network of WTAs.
Our implementation supports extension of WTA, coming from the language of the UPPAAL model
checker [17]. Such models can contain integer variables that can be present in transition guards, and they
can be updated only when a discrete transition is taken. Additionally, we support other features of the
UPPAAL model checker’s input language such as data structures and user-defined functions.
A parametrized WTA M(p) is a WTA in which some integer constant (transition weight or constant
in variable assignment/clock invariant) is replaced by a parameter p.
For defining properties we use cost-constraint temporal logic PWCTL, which contains formulas of
the form ♦c≤Cφ . Here c is an observer clock (that is never reset and grows to infinity on any infinite run
of a WTA), C ∈ IR≥0 is a constant and φ is a state-predicate. We say that a run pi satisfies ♦c≤Cφ if there
exists a state (l,v) ∈ pi in this run such that it satisfies φ and v(c)≤C. We define Pr[M |= ψ ] to be equal
to the probability that a random run of M satisfies ψ .
3 Modeling Formalism and problem statement
We consider that each node operates according to one out of finitely many configurations. Thus a network
of N nodes can be modelled by:
S(p1, p2, . . . , pN)≡ M(p1)‖M(p2)‖ . . .‖M(pN)‖C (1)
where M is a parametrized model of a node, pi ∈ P (i.e, the behavior of a node relies on some value -
strategy - assigned to the parameters), P is a finite set of configurations and C is a model of a medium.
Consider a parameterized NWTA S(p1, p2, . . . , pN) that models a wireless network of N nodes. Here
each pi defines a configuration of a node i and ranges over a finite domain P. Since the players (nodes)
are symmetric, we can analyze the game from the point of view of the first node only. Thus we will
consider the goal of the first node only, and this goal is defined by a PWCTL formula ψ .
4 Computing Nash Equilibrium in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks: A Simulation-Based Approach
We can view a system as a game G = (N,P,U), where N is a number of players (nodes), P is a set of
strategies (parameters) and U : PN → [0,1] is an utility function of the first player defined as
U(p1, p2, . . . , pN)≡ Pr[S(p1, p2, . . . , pN) |= ψ ] (2)
We consider that there is a master node that knows the network configuration (here the number of
nodes) and broadcasts the strategy (parameter) that all the nodes should use.
If all the nodes are honest, they will play according to the strategy proposed by the master node.
Thus in this case the master node should use a symmetric optimal strategy, i.e. a strategy p such that for
all other strategies p′ we have U(p, p, . . . , p)≥U(p′, p′, . . . , p′).
However, if there are selfish nodes, they might deviate from the symmetric optimal strategy to in-
crease the value of their utility functions (and the rest of the nodes can possibly suffer from that). Thus
we will consider a Nash Equilibrium strategy that is stable with respect to the behavior of such selfish
nodes (but possibly this strategy is less efficient than the symmetric optimal one). More formally, a strat-
egy p is said to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE), iff for all p′ ∈ P we have U(p, p, . . . , p)≥U(p′, p, . . . , p).
However, a Nash Equilibrium may not exist [16]2, thus in this paper we will consider a relaxed
definition of Nash Equilibrium.
Definition 2 A strategy p satisfies symmetric δ -relaxed NE iff for all p′ ∈ P we have U(p, p, . . . , p) ≥
δ ·U(p′, p, . . . , p).
The value of δ measures the quality of a strategy p. If δ ≥ 1, then δ -relaxed NE satisfies the
traditional definition of the (non-relaxed) NE. Otherwise, if 1− δ is small, then we can conclude that
a node’s gain of switching is negligible and it’ll stick with the δ -relaxed NE strategy. A δ -relaxed NE
strategy can be also used when a set of possible strategies is infinite. In this case we can discritize this
set (approximate it by a finite set of strategies) and search for a δ -relaxed NE strategy in this finite set.
If an utility function is smooth, then this strategy can be a good approximation for a NE in the original
(infinite) set of strategies.
In this paper, we will solve the problem of searching for a strategy that satisfies δ -relaxed NE for as
large δ as it is possible.
For readability, in the rest of the paper we will write U(p′, p) and S(p′, p) instead of U(p′, p, . . . , p)
and S(p′, p, . . . , p), respectively.
4 Algorithm for Computing Nash Equilibrium
One may suggest that in order to compute NE we can compute the values of U(p′, p) for all pairs (p′, p)
and then use definition 2 to compute the maximal value of δ . However, we can’t do that because the
problem of evaluating PWCTL formula on a model (i.e. computing Pr[S |= ψ ]) is undecidable in general
for WTA [7].
In this paper, we will use Statistical Model Checking (SMC) [18] based approach to overcome this
undecidability problem. The main idea of this approach is to perform a large number of simulations and
then apply the results of statistics to estimate the probability that a system satisfies a given property.
Our method of computing NE consists of two phases. During the first phase (presented in Section
4.1) we apply a simulation-based algorithm to search for the best candidate p for a Nash Equilibrium.
Then, in the second phase (presented in Section 4.2), we apply statistics to evaluate p, i.e. to find the
2Note, that we assume only non-mixed (pure) strategies.
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Algorithm 1 Computation Of The Best Candidate For Nash Equilibrium
Input: P = {pi} — finite set of parameters, U(pi, pk) — utility function, d ∈ [0,1] — threshold
Algorithm:
1. for every pi ∈ P compute estimation U˜(pi, pi)
2. waiting := P
3. candidates := /0
4. while len(waiting)> 1:
5. pick some unexplored pair (pi, pk) ∈ P×waiting
6. compute estimation U˜(pi, pk)
7. if U˜(pk, pk)< d ·U˜(pi, pk):
8. remove pk from waiting
9. else if ∀p′i U˜(p′i, pk) is already computed
10. remove pk from waiting
11. add pk to candidates
12. return argmaxp∈candidates minp′∈P(U˜(p, p)/U˜(p′, p))
maximum δ such that with a given significance level we can accept the statistical hypothesis that p is a
δ -relaxed Nash Equilibrium.
In the rest of the paper, we use straightforward simulation-based Monte Carlo method for computing
estimations of utility function’s values. In this method we perform n random simulations of S(p′, p)
for a given pair (p′, p) and count the number k of how many simulations satisfied ψ . Then we use the
following estimation: U˜(p′, p) = k/n.
4.1 Finding a Candidate for a Nash Equilibrium
As a first step, the algorithm computes estimations U˜(p′, p) for various p′ and p and search for a param-
eter p that maximizes the value of minp′∈P(U˜(p, p)/U˜(p′, p)).
Additionally, we speedup the search by introducing a heuristic threshold d (that is a parameter of our
algorithm) and pruning parameters p such that U˜(p, p)/U˜(p′, p)< d.
Our algorithm (see Algorithm 1) starts with the computation of estimations U˜(pi, pk) at diagonal
points (i.e. when i = k). After that we iteratively pick a random pair of strategies (pi, pk) and compute
U˜(pi, pk). If U˜(pk, pk)/U˜(pi, pk) < d, then we remove strategy pk from the further consideration and
will never consider again pairs of the form (?, pk).
We iterate the while-loop until we split all the parameters into those p for which we already computed
the value of minp′∈P(U˜(p, p)/U˜(p′, p)), and those, for which we know that U˜(p, p)/U˜(p′, p) < d for
some p′. Then at line 12 we choose a strategy p that maximizes minp′∈P(U˜(p, p)/U˜ (p′, p))
It should be noted, that if a threshold d is large, then our algorithm can possibly return no result
(because all the candidates will be filtered out). In this case one can retry with a smaller d and reuse the
already computed estimations. If d is equal to zero, then the algorithm is guaranteed to return a result.
4.2 Evaluation of a Relevance of the Candidate
Consider that after the first phase we selected a strategy p. Let Hp,δ be a statistical hypothesis that p is a
δ -relaxed NE. Now we want to find the maximal δ such that we can accept the hypothesis Hp,δ with a
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given significance level α (that is a parameter of the algorithm)3.
To do that we firstly reestimate U˜(p′, p) for every p′ ∈ P (possibly using the number of simulations
that is different from the one that was used in the first phase, this will be discussed below).
Then we apply the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Suppose that for all p′ ∈ S we estimated U˜(p′, p) using n random simulations, and f (δ )≤α ,
where
f (δ )≡ ∑
i=1..N
1
2
(
1− er f (√n(U˜(p, p)−δ ·U˜(pi, p)))
)
(3)
and er f (x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0 e
−t2 dt is Gauss error function. Then we can accept the statistical hypothesis Hp,δ
with the significance level of α .
Proof: Let qi =U(pi, pk) and q˜i = U˜(pi, pk). Then pk satisfies δ -relaxed Nash Equilibrium iff ∀i ·qk ≥
δqi Consider that we have n Bernoulli random variables ζ1,ζ2, . . . ,ζn where Pr[ζi = 1] = qi. Consider
that random variable ξi is a mean of n independent observations of ζi, i.e. ξi = ∑ j=1..n ζi/n Then each
q˜i is an independent observation of ξi and for large n we have ξi ∼N (qi,qi(1− qi)/n). Probability of
making type II error (accept Hpk,δ when it is false) is less or equal to
Pr[ξ1 = q˜1,ξ2 = q˜2, . . . ,ξn = q˜N‖
∨
i=1..N
qk < δ ·qi] (4)
, that in turn is less or equal to
∑
i=1..N
Pr[ξ1 = q˜1,ξ2 = q˜2, . . . ,ξn = q˜N‖qk < δ ·qi] (5)
, that in turn is less or equal to
∑
i=1..N
Pr[ξi = q˜i,ξk = p˜k‖qk < δ ·qi] (6)
, that in turn is less or equal to
∑
i=1..N
Pr[(ξk −δ ·ξi) = (q˜k −δ · q˜i)‖qk −δ ·qi < 0] (7)
For each i we have:
(ξk−δ ·ξi)∼N (qk −δqi,(qk(1−qk)+qi(1−qi))/n) (8)
The truth of the theorem follows from the fact that qk(1−qk)+qi(1−qi)≤ 0.5. 
We apply this theorem in the following way. We first search for an integer-valued b such that f (b)<
0. Then we use bisection numerical method to find a root of an equation f (δ ) = α on the interval [0,b].
It can be easily seen that the function f decreases and f (0) > 0 and it implies that this δ satisfies the
condition of the theorem.
Our method provides only a lower bound for δ and the theorem 1 does not state how many simu-
lations are needed to compute a good estimation of δ . Indeed, we can compute statistically valid δ for
3The significance level is a statistical parameter that defines the probability of accepting a hypothesis although it is actually
false.
P. Bulychev, A. David, K.G. Larsen, A. Legay, M. Mikucˇionis 7
 0.75
 0.8
 0.85
 0.9
 0.95
 1
 500  1500  5000  14000  45000 140000
 0.85
 0.9
 0.95
 1
 1.05
 1.1
 500  1500  5000  14000  45000  140000
N=2
N=10
N=100
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 0.97  0.976  0.982  0.988  0.994  1
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 800
 900
 1.07  1.076  1.082  1.088  1.094  1.1
Figure 1: The experimental evaluation of the application of theorem 1. In the upper plots the x axis
denotes the number of simulations n, and y axis denotes an average estimated value of δ computed using
theorem 1 for these numbers of simulations and the significance level of α = 0.05. N is the total number
of strategies. The bottom plots demonstrate the frequency distribution for the computed values of δ for
100000 simulations and 100 possible strategies. The left and right plots correspond to the cases when
the real value of δ is equal to 1.0 and 1.1.
any number of simulations. And if the estimated value of δ is small, it can be a result of the fact that the
number of simulations is insufficient or the real value of δ is small (or both).
Thus we performed an experiment to see how accurate is our method depending on the number of
simulations. We developed a simple model of our method, and in this model we assume that there are N
strategies {p1, p2, . . . pN}, and we want to check that p1 is a Nash Equilibrium. The value of the utility
function U(p1, p) is equal to 0.5 for p 6= p1, and it is equal to 0.5 ·δ when p = p1 (thus p1 is a δ -relaxed
NE). The experimental data for the cases when δ = 1.0 and δ = 1.1 is presented at Fig. 1. A reader can
see that the results for these two cases are similar, and our other experiments (with δ ranging from 0.5 to
2.0) also demonstrate this similarity. The accuracy of our method increases as the number of simulation
n increases or the number of possible strategies N decreases. One can also see, that for this experiment
100000 simulations seem to be enough to compute a good approximation for δ that is both statistically
valid (this is ensured by the theorem 1) and close to the real value of δ .
4.3 Implementation Details
We developed a tool written in Python programming language that implements the proposed algorithm.
This tool uses UPPAAL model checker as a simulation and monitoring engine for PWCTL properties.
Our algorithm is based on Monte Carlo simulations and thus it is embarrassingly parallisable. In
our implementation we exploit this parallelisability by computing the estimations for different pairs of
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busy?
nt>0
nt==0
100−TransmitProb
busy!
busy!
TransmitProb
x<=1 &&
energy’==1 &&
time’ == 1
INITIAL
x<=1 &&
energy’==0 &&
time’ == 1
x==1
x==1
WAIT
TRANSMIT
x <= 1 &&
time’==0 &&
energy’ == 0
x:=0
x:=0,
nt:=nt−1
nt:=nt+1,
x:=0
ns:=ns + 1,
nt:= nt − 1,
x := 0
Figure 2: Model of Aloha in UPPAAL
strategies on different nodes. The tool can be run on a cluster. One node acts as a master and picks the
parameters pi, p j that the slave nodes use to compute the estimations U˜(pi, p j). The master node does not
use any external job scheduler and submits jobs on its own using SSH connection to the computational
nodes. Currently we rely on the fact that the nodes share the same distributed file system, but in principle
the master node can deploy all executables and models by itself.
5 Results of Application
In this paper we report on results of application of our tool to two contention resolution protocols. The
first one is Aloha CSMA/CD protocol that we model on a very abstract level and we’ll describe our
model in details. The second one is IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA that we model with a high precision and
we’ll just briefly sketch its structure.
For both case studies we used the following parameters. The number of simulations for estimation of
utility function’s values is equal to 10000 for the first phase of our algorithm (searching for the best can-
didate for NE) and 100000 for the second phase (evaluation of this candidate). The value of d parameter
is equal to 0.9, and the value of significance level α is equal to 0.05.
All the experiments were performed on the 8 node cluster, where each node has an Intel c© Core R©2
Quad CPU.
5.1 Application to Aloha CSMA/CD protocol
Aloha protocol [2] is a simple Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)
protocol that was used in the first known wireless data network developed at the University of Hawaii in
1971.
In this protocol it is assumed that there are several nodes that share the same wireless medium. Each
node is listening to its own signal during its transmission and checks that the signal is not corrupted by
another node’s transmission. In case of collision both nodes will stop transmitting immediately and wait
for a random time before they’ll try to transmit again.
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Figure 3: U˜(p′, p) (left) and its diagonal slice (right) for Aloha with 5 nodes
Number of nodes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
δ -relaxed NE strategy pNE 0.37 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.41
Value of δ 0.992 0.980 0.992 0.990 0.993 0.992 0.987
U˜(pNE , pNE) 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.89 0.75 0.61 0.50
Symmetric optimal strategy popt 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.14
U˜(pOpt , popt) 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.87 0.98 0.76
Computation time 2m5s 3m44s 7m62s 15m45s 26m11s 37m55s 59m15s
Table 1: Nash equilibrium (NE) and Symmetric optimal (Opt) strategies for Aloha
In our paper we consider unslotted Aloha in which the nodes are not necessary synchronized. Ad-
ditionally, we study k-persistent variant of Aloha, i.e. a protocol implementation in which a random
delay before retransmission is distributed according to a geometric distribution. This means that for each
next time slot a node will transmit with probability TransmitProb and will wait for one more slot (and
then decide again) with probability 1−TransmitProb. We assume that a node can change the value
of TransmitProb, thus a strategy of a node consists of choosing a value of TransmitProb. We also
assume that a node can use one out of 100 of discretized values {0.01,0.02, . . . ,1} of TransmitProb.
The UPPAAL model of a single node is presented at Fig. 2. Wireless media is modeled using a broad-
cast channel busy (in which a signal is sent each time a new transmission starts) and integer variable
nt (that stores the number of stations that are currently transmitting). Variable ns stores the number of
successful transmissions. Time can pass only in locations INITIAL, TRANSMIT and WAIT, two other loca-
tions are urgent. A node uses clocks x, time (that stores a time passed since the beginning) and energy
(that stores the amount of energy consumed, i.e. the amount of time spent in the location TRANSMIT).
We assume that there is a random uniformly distributed offset between the initial states of the
nodes (it is modeled by delay in location INITIAL). This may correspond to the situation, when there
is a wireless sensor network and all sensors are aimed towards the same event. As soon as this event
happens, all the node will start transmission, but they will not be necessarily synchronized.
In our experiments we assumed that the goal of a node is to transmit a single frame within 50 time
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units and to limit energy consumption by 3. This goal can be expressed using the following PWCTL
formula:
♦Node(0).time≤50(Node(0).ns≥ 1∧Node(0).energy≤ 3) (9)
It should be noted, that even our (unslotted) Aloha model looks simple, we can’t propose an analytical
way of computing U(p′, p) for a given values of p′ and p. The problem is that our model works in real-
time and we can’t decompose its behavior into rounds (slots) and compute U(p′, p) recursively based on
the nodes’ actions in the current round and values of U(p′, p) in the next possible rounds (like it was
done in [19] for slotted Aloha).
Fig. 3 depicts the plot of the utility function estimation U˜(p′, p) for the first player for the network of
5 nodes (remind, that p′ is a strategy of the first player, and p is common strategy of all the other players).
It also shows Nash Equilibrium (NE) and symmetric optimal (Opt) strategies. It should be noted, that
due to the usage of d parameter our algorithm didn’t compute U˜(p′, p) for all possible p and p′ (in fact,
only 3742 out of 10000 values were computed).
Intuitively, a Nash Equilibrium for Aloha exists, because a node has to satisfy both time and energy
constraints. When the honest nodes use the value of TransmitProb that is close to 1, it forces the selfish
node to use a smaller value of TransmitProb to bound the number of collisions (and hence the energy
consumption). When the default value of TransmitProb is close to 0, the selfish node uses a larger value
of TransmitProb to decrease the expected time before the next retransmission, since the probability of
a collision is small for this case. This ensures that a Nash Equilibrium strategy exists in between 0 and 1.
Table 1 contains the results for ALOHA with different number of nodes. It can be seen, that relaxed
NE and symmetric optimal strategies coincide for the case of two network nodes, but for the networks
with more nodes relaxed NE is less efficient than symmetrical optimal strategy.
5.2 Application to IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA Protocol
IEEE 802.15.4 standard [22] specifies the physical layer and media access control layer for low-cost and
low-rate wireless personal area networks. Upper layers are not covered by IEEE 802.15.4 and are left to
be extended in industry and individual applications. One of such extensions is ZigBee [3] that together
with IEEE 802.15.4 completes description of a network stack. Typical applications of ZigBee include
smart home control and wireless sensor networks.
We applied our tool to the analysis of Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) network
contention protocol being a part of IEEE 802.15.4. Unlike Aloha, the IEEE 802.15.4 standard assumes
that a wireless node can’t listen to its own transmission and thus it is not possible to detect a collision as
soon as it occurs and stop transmission. A node will detect a collision later when it does not receive an
acknowledgment within a given time bound. Before each transmission a node performs a Clear Channel
Assessment (CCA), i.e. checks that no other node is transmitting. If CCA was not successful (the
medium was busy), then the node waits for a random time before performing CCA again, and this time is
distributed according to the binary exponential backoff mechanism (that is controlled by the parameters
MinBE, MaxBE and UnitBackoff in our model). If CCA was successful (the medium was clear), then the
node switches to the transmitting mode and starts transmission. However, this switching takes non-zero
time (TurnAround in our model), and another node can start transmitting during this period, that will
lead to a collision.
The standard defines both slotted (with beacon synchronization) and unslotted modes of CSMA/CA;
in our paper we consider only unslotted one.
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collision_occured
x==TurnAround
x==FrameLength
!collision_occured
collision_occured
x == TurnAround
(x==backoff*UnitBackoff)
FAILURE
x==TurnAround
(x == CCA_duration) && !cca_passed
(x==CCA) && (cca_passed)
SUCCESS
x==ACK_Time
nretries == (MaxFrameRetries−1)
!collision_occured
nb == MaxNB
nb < MaxNB
nretries < (MaxFrameRetries−1)
x==ACK
x==MinLIFS
x:=0
nb := nb+1
cca_passed:=(nt==0)
x:=0
x:=0
collision_occured:=(nt>0)
nt:=nt+1
x:=0
nt:=nt−1
collision_occured:=(nt>0)
nt:=nt+1
x:=0
busy?
busy!
backoff := random(0..pow(2,be))
x:=0
busy?
busy?
TRANSMIT_DATA
WAIT_BACKOFF
nretries = nretries + 1
be:=macMinBE, nb:=0
CCA VULNERABLE
x:=0
x:=0
collision_occured:=true
cca_passed:=false
nt:=nt−1
collision_occured:=true
be:= (be+1 > MaxBE ? MaxBE: be+1)
busy!
energy’ == TX_Power
x<=TurnAround
x<=FrameLength
x<=aTurnaroundTime
energy’ == RX_Power
x<=CCA
x<=backoff*UnitBackoff
x<=waking_delay
energy’ == RX_Power
x<=ACK_Time
x<=ACK_timex<=MinLIFS
x<=TurnAround
Figure 4: Model of IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA
The model of a single node operating according to IEEE 802.15.4 CSMA/CA is depicted at Fig. 4.
The values of MinBE, MaxBE, MaxFrameRetries, TurnAroundwere taken from the IEEE 802.15.4 stan-
dard assuming that the network is operating on baud rate 20kbps and on 868 Mhz band. FrameLength is
considered to be 35 bytes (including 25 bytes for ZigBee header and 10 bytes for the valuable informa-
tion). We assume that the frame size is 35 bytes (25 bytes for ZigBee header and 10 bytes for the actual
data). Energy consumption constraints TX_Power and RX_Power were taken from the specification of
U-Power 500 chip (54 mA and 26 mA operating on 3.0V respectively).
We assume that a node can change the value of UnitBackoff parameter. This parameter linearly
scales the binary exponential backoff scheme. If its value is equal to 0, then a node will try to transmit as
soon as it wants to. The large values of UnitBackoff corresponds to large delays before transmission.
We consider that the possible values of UnitBackoff are {0,1,2, . . . ,50}. We assume that the goal of a
node for CSMA/CA is similar to the one used in the Aloha case study (i.e. to transmit a frame within the
given time and energy bounds).
Our tool detected a trivial NE UnitBackoff=0, see the plot at Fig. 5 (left) for an illustration. It
means that a selfish node will always try to transmit as soon as possible by choosing UnitBackoff=0.
This coincides with the results of [9] obtained for IEEE 802.11 CSMA/CA protocol. Intuitively, it is
always profitable to transmit as soon as possible since if a selfish node will retransmit just after the col-
lision, the rest (honest) nodes will probably detect this during the Clear Channel Assessment procedure
and they will not corrupt the retransmission of the selfish node.
In order to illustrate our algorithm we also considered the situation when network nodes (game
players) form coalitions. It can correspond to the situation when several network devices belong to the
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Figure 5: U˜(p′, p) for CSMA/CA for 5 nodes without(left) and with(right) coalitions
Number of nodes in one coalition 1 2 3 4 5
δ -relaxed NE strategy pNE 11 8 15 25 28
Value of δ 0.900 0.985 0.986 0.990 0.990
U˜(pNE , pNE) 0.86 0.76 0.81 0.85 0.83
Symmetric optimal strategy popt 13 23 31 34 48
U˜(popt , popt) 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.86
Time 1m08s 5m45s 7m62s 32m49s 57m59s
Table 2: Nash equilibrium (NE) and Symmetric optimal (Opt) strategies for CSMA/CA with coalitions
same user and it will not be profitable for the user if these devices compete with each other. The intuition
is that players of the same coalition will not choose “always transmit” strategy because in this case they
will disturb each other. This is confirmed by plot at Fig. 5 (right) and table 2, where we considered the
case of two coalitions of the same size.
6 Related Work
The paper [19] is the first one that applies the concept of Nash Equilibrium to the analysis of Medium
Access and power control games in slotted Aloha protocol. Later this approach has been applied to
the most of the layers of a network stack: to the Physical [4, 19, 20], Medium Access [21, 9, 11, 15],
Network [14, 25] and Application [8] layers.
Although our approach can be in principle applied to any network layer, it is particularly well suited
for the random access Medium Access layer protocols, since such protocols possess probabilistic behav-
ior (here we can use our Weighted Timed Automata semantics) and work in real-time. In this settings,
our SMC-based approach extends the manual analytical approach, that can be complicated, error-prone
and typically applied to slotted (discrete time) protocols only [11, 19]. On the other hand, our approach
extends the simulation-based approach (for instance, [9]), since we formally describe a modeling for-
malism for which we can provide a confidence on the results.
Additionally, in our paper we use the expressive PWCTL logic to express the goals of the network
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nodes, and thus to define their utility functions with respect to time and energy constraints. This allows
us to apply the same framework to the analysis of different protocols, while another approaches does not
allow such a generalization.
Our experimental results extend those proposed in [19] from the slotted Aloha to the unslotted one.
Up to our knowledge, we are also the first ones, who study coalitions between nodes in the IEEE 802.15.4
CSMA/CA protocol.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a methodology to apply statistical model checking to search for a Nash
equilibrium on different types of networks. Experiments demonstrate the maturity of our technique and
shows that it can be applied in principle to more complex problems. The technique avoids analytical
analysis of the model and contrary to pure simulation-based techniques, ours provides statistical confi-
dence on its results. As future work we will extend the language of our tool to be able to apply it to other
domains such as biological systems.
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